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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this proceeding pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
This Court has granted certiorari to review the following issues: 
1. Whether section 34A-2-422 of the Utah Code proscribes payments 
to a trust employed to facilitate an assignment of those payments to a creditor. 
2. Whether the Labor Commission may be obligated to direct payments 
to a trust for subsequent transfer to a creditor. 
Standard of review. On certiorari, this Court reviews the Court of Appeals' 
decision for correctness with no deference to the Court of Appeals' conclusions of 
law. Thomas v. Color Country Management, 84 P.3d 1201, 1205 (Utah 2004). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Section 34A-2-422 of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act is 
determinative of the issues presented by this appeal: 
Compensation before payment shall be exempt from all claims of 
creditors, and from attachment or execution, and shall be paid only 
to employees or their dependents. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: Florida Asset Financing Corporation seeks to compel 
the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, a subdivision of the Utah Labor Commission, 
to deliver Robert Williams' workers' compensation disability benefits to the 
1 
trustee of the "Robert Williams Irrevocable Trust" so that those benefits can, in 
turn, be paid over to Florida Asset.1 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below: Florida Asset filed a 
complaint in the district court against the Commission and Mr. Williams, alleging 
that the Commission had wrongfully paid disability compenseition directly to Mr. 
Williams instead of to the trustee of the Williams Trust. Florida Asset based its 
complaint against the Commission on theories of 1) contract, 2) promissory 
estoppel, and 3) secured transaction. (R. at 1.) 
Florida Asset served its complaint on Mr. Williams by publication. (R. 90.) 
Mr. Williams failed to appear and was defaulted. (R. at 190.) The Commission 
moved for summary judgment against Florida Asset on the grounds that no 
contractual relationship existed between the Commission and Florida Asset, and 
that Section 34A-2-422 of the Utah Workers5 Compensation Act required the 
Commission to pay Mr. Williams5 disability compensation directly to him, rather 
than to the trustee of the Williams Trust. (R. at 63-70.) Florida Asset filed a 
motion for partial summary judgment on its secured transaction claim against the 
Commission. (R. at 93.) 
1
 In this brief, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund and the Utah Labor Commission 
are referred to jointly as "the Commission." The Employers5 Reinsurance Fund 
("ERF") is established by Section34A-2-702 of the Utah Workers' Compensation 
as a fund within the Utah Labor Commission for the purpose of paying permanent 
total disability compensation and medical benefits to individueils such as Mr. 
Williams who were injured in work-related accidents prior to July 1, 1994. 
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District Court Judge Henriod denied the Commission's motion for 
summary judgment and granted Florida Asset's motion for partial summary 
judgment. (R. at 222.) Judge Henriod ordered the Commission to pay Mr. 
Williams' disability compensation to the trustee of the Williams Trust for 
subsequent payment over to Florida Asset. Judge Henriod also ordered the 
Commission to pay damages of $57,095.96, plus interest, to Florida Asset. 
(Appendix A; R. at 222-225.) 
The Commission appealed Judge Henriod's ruling to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. After briefing and oral argument, the Court of Appeals reversed Judge 
Henriod's decision. The Court of Appeals concluded that the plain language of 
Section 34A-2-422 required the Commission to pay Mr. Williams' workers' 
compensation disability benefits directly to Mr. Williams. (Appendix B.) 
This Court subsequently granted Florida Asset's petition for Writ of 
Certiorari to review of the Court of Appeals' decision. 
Statement of facts. Mr. Williams worked as a long-haul truck driver until 
December 1990, when he was involved in a multi-vehicle accident. The accident 
left him with serious head injuries and injuries to his back, shoulder and knees. (R. 
at 112.) 
Mr. Williams' injuries left him completely unable to work. (R. at 113; 
Appendix C.) On November 17, 1994, the Utah Industrial Commission awarded 
2
 The Utah Industrial Commission became the Utah Labor Commission on July 
1, 1997. 
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permanent total disability compensation to him. Under the Commission's order, 
Mr. Williams was to receive monthly payments of disability compensation for the 
remainder of his life or until further order of the Commission. (Appendix C.) 
A few months later, on May 18, 1995, Mr. Williams somehow became 
involved with Florida Asset in a complex financial arrangement whereby Mr. 
Williams traded his future disability compensation totaling $236,624 for an 
immediate cash payment of $68,706. (R. 130 and 124.) The transaction was 
structured as follows. 
On May 25, 1995, Mr. Williams signed a trust document creating the 
"Robert W. Williams Irrevocable Trust," with the stated purpose to "manage" Mr. 
Williams' assets and provide for his "maintenance, comfort and support." (R. 
116.) However, Philip Nadel of Palm Beach County, Florida, was designated as 
trustee even though Mr. Williams resided in Utah. Furthermore, the Trust's sole 
asset was Mr. Williams' disability compensation, and only from June 1995 to 
April 2012, the exact period of time necessary for Florida Asset 1o recoup its loan. 
(R. at 116.) The trust document also gave Mr. Nadel specific authority to 
negotiate Mr. Williams's disability compensation checks. (R. at 120.) 
Also on May 25, 1995, Mr. Williams signed an assignment and security 
agreement in which he granted Florida Asset a security interest in the Williams 
Trust to secure payment of the loan from Florida Asset. This assignment was 
accepted by Joel Nadel, President of Florida Asset. Philip Nadel, as trustee of the 
Williams Trust, acknowledged receipt of the assignment. (R. at 124.) 
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Finally, also on May 25, 1995, Mr. Williams signed what was styled an 
"Irrevocable Letter of Direction." This document omitted any mention of Mr. 
Williams' dealings with Florida Asset but instead merely reported that Mr. 
Williams had established the Trust "to better manage (his) financial resources." 
The letter directed the Commission to pay future monthly disability compensation 
to Mr. Williams "to me in care of [Philip Nadel], Trustee." The document also 
stated that its instructions were binding and not subject to change by Mr. 
Williams. (R. at 128.) An "Acceptance" was attached to the letter purporting to 
bind the Commission to the terms of the letter. (R. at 129.) 
On June 1, 1995, Navada Stambaugh, an accounting technician at the 
Commission, signed the "Acceptance" and also signed a letter "To Whom It May 
Concern" stating that "(e)ffective June 21, 1995, (Mr. Williams') checks will be 
sent in care of Philip Nadel, Trustee." (R. at 121 and 129.) 
On June 14, 1995, two U.C.C. financing statements were filed in Utah. In 
the first financing statement, Philip Nadel, acting as trustee of the Williams Trust, 
claimed security interests in 1) Mr. Williams' future disability compensation 
payments and 2) the "irrevocable letter of direction" Mr. Williams had signed. (R. 
at 132.) In the second financing statement, Philip Nadel, ersatz trustee of the 
Williams Trust, claimed a security interest in the Williams Trust on behalf of 
Florida Asset. (R. at 133.) 
Two weeks later, on June 30, 1995, and absent any default of Mr. 
Williams' obligations, Florida Asset obtained a consent judgment from a Florida 
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court "directing" the Commission to pay Mr. Williams' workers' disability 
benefits to Florida Asset and enjoining Williams from modifying his Irrevocable 
Letter of Direction to the Commission. The Commission was not a party and was 
unaware of this Florida proceeding. (R. at 136.) 
For the next several years, the Commission sent Mr. Williams' monthly 
disability compensation checks to the Trust. Then, during November 1999, Mr. 
Williams instructed the Commission to pay his disability compensation to him. 
The Commission complied with Mr.Williams' updated instructions. (R. at 142.) 
This prompted Florida Asset to send a letter addressed to Ms. Stambaugh. This 
letter reported for the first time that a Florida court had entered a "Final Judgment 
of Garnishment" in 1997 requiring the Commission to pay Mr. Williams' 
disability benefits to Florida Asset. (R. at 140.) 
By this time, Ms. Stambaugh was no longer employed by the Commission. 
Consequently, Florida Asset's letter came to the attention of the ERF 
Administrator. It was in this manner that Commission officials first became aware 
of Florida Asset's dealings with Mr. Williams. The Commission notified Florida 
Asset that the Commission would comply with Mr. Williams' instructions to pay 
his disability compensation directly 1o him. The Commission also advised Florida 
Asset that section 34A-2-422 of the Utah Workers' Compensation exempted 
disability compensation from creditors' claims and required payment of disability 
compensation directly to the injured worker. (R. at 142.) 
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Florida Asset then filed suit in District Court in Washington County, Utah, 
to compel Mr. Williams to redirect his disability benefits back to the Trust. Mr. 
Williams failed to appear and on October 16, 2000, the District Court granted 
Florida Asset's request. (R. at 144.) 
On March 27, 2001, the Commission received Mr. Williams' letter 
redirecting payment of his disability compensation to the Trust. (R. 147 and 148.) 
However, on April 16, 2001, Florida Asset advised the Commission that Mr. 
Williams had filed for bankruptcy. (R. at 148.) The bankruptcy stay was 
subsequently lifted to allow Florida Asset to pursue its claims under state law 
against Mr. Williams. (R. at 150.) Mr. Williams again directed the Commission 
to pay his disability benefits directly to him. The Commission advised Florida 
Asset that it would comply with Mr. Williams' instructions. (R. at 153 and 154.) 
Florida Asset responded by filing the District Court complaint that has led to this 
proceeding before the Utah Supreme Court. (R. at 1.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah Workers Compensation Act embodies a public policy and 
legislative intent to "secure compensation to an injured employee . . . (and) to 
relieve society of the care and support of the unfortunate victims of the industrial 
accident." Reteuna v. Industrial Commission, 185 P. 535, 537 (Utah 1919). This 
purpose is accomplished by providing periodic payment of workers' compensation 
disability benefits to injured workers so they can maintain their dignity and self-
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sufficiency, and at the same time avoid the necessity of seeking charity or public 
welfare. 
Section 34A-2-422 implements the objectives of the Act by requiring that 
all disability compensation be paid to the injured worker, and no one else. 
Furthermore, section 422 exempts an injured workers5 disability compensation 
from all claims of creditors until such compensation has been paid to the injured 
worker. 
The case now before this Court is one of first impression in Utah. It 
presents the exact situation section 422 was intended to prevent. Mr. Williams, 
formerly a productive and self-sufficient worker, suffered serious and permanent 
head injuries and other injuries in a work-related accident. He is QOW permanently 
and totally disabled. The workers' compensation system provided Mr. Williams 
with monthly disability compensation sufficient to provide for his basic needs, 
now and indefinitely into the future. Mr. Williams' right to receive this monthly 
disability compensation was protected by section 422 of the Act. 
Now, however, Florida Asset purports to have acquired the right to receive the 
next 17 years of Mr. Williams' benefits, totaling $236,624, in return for a single lump-
sum payment of $68,706.06. While there has been no trial in this matter, the 
documentary record reveals that Florida Asset devised an elaborate plan to 
circumvent the Act's protection of Mr. Williams' disability compensation. The 
scheme involved trusts, assignments, "irrevocable letters of direction," security 
agreements, consent decrees and default judgments, all with the purpose of 
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keeping Mr. Will iams' disability compensation out of Mr. Will iams' hands and 
diverting the disability compensation to Florida Asset 's own benefit. 
Nevertheless, section 12 protects . •. N • S 
>."••<. Mr. Williams' disability compensation, 
before payment, is exempt from all claims of creditors. This precludes Florida 
Asset ' s attempts to tie up Mr. Will iams' future disability compensa:<*>n v 
section 422 provide^ llnil h 11 \\ 1111 11 11s,ihi 111 \ 11111ipensation shall be paid only 
((» l\It Williams. This precludes payment of the compensation to the Williams 
Trust for the benefit of Florida Asset. 
The Court - vppeals has iqiv'Uil Hiiriilii Assrl s argument that the 
Commission r.'i ?v compelled to pay Mr. Williams' disability compensation to 
anyone other than ) Williams. The Court of Appeals ' decision is consistent 
with the r language and publn pohev ul su lion '"I1","" 1 In ConimisMon 
rcspct •• • Ihis ('oijrl lo affirm the Court of Appeals ' decision. 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT ONE: THE P L A I N L A N G U A G E O F SECTION 422 
P R O T E C T S MR. WILLIAMS 5 DISABILITY BENEFITS 
F R O M A L L CREDITORS' CLAIMS A N D REQUIRES 
P A Y M E N T ONLY T O MR. WILLIAMS. 
Statutory interpretation begins with the plain language of the statute itself. 
In State v. Redd, 992 | \ 2d 1>X(>. Wi l l i "(JII M W , IIIIS Couil observed: 
We start our analysis with the statute's plain language. "The 
fundamental rule of statutory construction is that statutes are 
generally to be construed according to their plain language. 
Unambiguous language in the statute may not be interpreted to 
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contradict its plain meaning." Zoll & Branch P.C v. Assay, 932 
P.2d at 594; Kimball Condo. Owners Ass'n v. County Bd. Of 
Equalization, 943 P.2d 642, 648 (Utah 1997). 
The meaning of section 422 is plain, unambiguous, and mandatory. It 
provides that "Compensation before payment shall be exempt from all claims of 
creditors, and from attachment or execution, and shall be paid only to employees 
or their dependents."(Emphasis added.) 
Section 422 has been a part of the Act since it was first adopted in 1917; 
similar provisions are common in other states' workers' compensation laws. The 
effect of these provisions is summarized in Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, 
Volume 4, § 89.07: 
The personal character of compensation payments also results in 
their being made nonassignable under the typical act. No outside 
agreement or even court order can give a compensation board power 
to order payment of such benefits to anyone but the persons 
specified in the statute. 
Section 422 consists of two parts. As its first part, section 422 provides that 
"compensation before payment shall be exempt from all claims of creditors, and 
from attachment or execution . . . ." Section 422's second part requires that 
compensation "shall be paid only to employees or their dependents." The 
significance of each part is discussed below. 
A. Until Mr. Williams' Disability Compensation Is Actually Paid, It Is 
Exempt From All Claims Of Creditors. 
Section 422 specifies that "compensation before payment shall be exempt 
from all claims of creditors, and from attachment or execution." In its initial brief 
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to this Court, Florida Asset argues it is not seeking to attach, execute against, or 
otherwise make a claim against Mr. Williams' compensation before that 
compensation has been paid to Mr. Williams. Instead, Florida Asset asserts it 
merely seeks to exercise its security interest against the Williams Trust. But that 
is not the full story. 
If Florida Asset were only seeking to exercise its rights against the 
Williams Trust, the Commission would not be involved in this controversy and the 
dispute would be entirely between Florida Asset and Mr. Williams. However, 
Florida Asset recognizes that the Williams Trust has no assets or source of income 
other than an expectancy of receiving Mr. Williams' future disability 
compensation. Consequently, it is imperative to Florida Asset that the 
Commission turn over Mr. Williams' future disability compensation directly to the 
Trust. To achieve that end, Florida Asset has devised the so-called "irrevocable 
letter of direction." This document applies to Mr. Williams' future disability 
compensation and prohibits the Commission from paying that future disability 
compensation to anyone other than the trustee of the Williams Trust.3 
In this context, the validity of the "irrevocable letter of direction" is the 
lynchpin to Florida Asset's scheme. The "irrevocable letter of direction," coupled 
with the terms of the Williams Trust, the assignment, and the security agreements, 
constitutes an attempt by Florida Asset to perfect its claim against Mr. Williams' 
3
 Of course, as soon as the disability compensation check was delivered to Philip 
Nadel, trustee of the Williams Trust, he would deposit it in the Trust and then pay 
it over to Florida Asset and its President, Joel Nadel. 
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future disability compensation before that disability compensation has been paid to 
Mr. Williams. 
While Florida Asset's efforts may be "creative/' as characterized by the 
Court of Appeals, those efforts nevertheless run afoul of the protection afforded by 
section 422, which provides that "compensation before payment shall be exempt 
from all claims of creditors. . . ." (Emphasis added.) By its plain language, the 
statute exempts Mr. Williams' compensation from all claims of creditors, 
including Florida Asset's claim as represented by the "irrevocable letter of 
direction" and other associated devices. 
B. Mr, Williams' Disability Compensation Can Only Be Paid To Him. 
Section 422 mandates that compensation "shall be paid only to employees 
or their dependents." It is difficult to imagine a statutory provision that could be 
less ambiguous. 
Despite section 422's clear requirement that Mr. Williams' disability 
compensation shall be paid only to Mr. Williams, Florida Asset argues that the 
Commission should deliver Mr. Williams' disability compensation to Philip Nadel 
as trustee of the Williams Trust. Florida Asset persists in this argument even 
though it is established that any disability compensation delivered to Philip Nadel 
is never paid to Mr. Williams, but is remitted directly to Florida Asset. 
Furthermore, Mr. Williams has specifically instructed the Commission to deliver 
his disability compensation directly to him. 
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Accepting Florida Asset's arguments would result in payment of Mr. 
Williams' disability compensation to Florida Asset. Such a result would not only 
be inconsistent with section 422, but would turn the statute on its head. Section 
422 should be applied according to its plain language—Mr. Williams' disability 
compensation should be paid only to Mr. Williams. 
C. Decisions From Other Jurisdictions Can Be Distinguished From the 
Circumstances of Mr, Williams' Case. 
Florida Asset has cited several decisions from other jurisdictions in support 
of its claim to Mr. Williams' disability compensation. Each of those decisions is 
distinguishable from the circumstances presented here. 
Ohio Bell Telephone Company v. Antonelli, 504 N.E. 2d 717 (Ohio 1987), 
addresses the ability of a judgment creditor to attach funds in the debtor's bank 
account, which funds were the proceeds from workers' compensation benefits that 
had already been paid directly to the injured worker/debtor, free from any pre-
existing claims of creditors. Unlike the circumstances now before this Court, the 
creditor in Ohio Bell did not assert any claim to injured worker's disability 
compensation before payment of the compensation to the injured worker, nor did 
the creditor attempt to prevent the compensation from being paid to the injured 
worker. 
In Romero v. Earl, 810 P.2d 808 (N. M. 1991), a medical provider treated 
an injured worker for his work-related injuries, then sought payment for his 
services by enforcing an assignment against a workers' compensation settlement 
13 
that was held by the injured worker's attorney. Applying a statute very similar to 
section 422 to the unique facts of Romero, the New Mexico Supreme Court held 
that the medical provider was entitled to payment. However, the New Mexico 
Court observed that the result might be different under different facts: "We 
believe that a meritorious claim of illegality may be raised by a worker with 
respect to the settlement proceeds of the worker's compensation claim in the event 
his or her attorney should withhold for medical providers any sums not received 
by the attorney for that specific purpose." Romero at 811. In other words, the New 
Mexico Court may have concluded that the medical provider was entitled to 
payment out of the workers' compensation settlement fund because the medical 
provider had treated the work-related injury. 
Finally, federal court decisions in In re Soma, 43 F.3d 637 (11th Cir. 1995) 
and First Colony Life Ins, Co. v. Berube, 130 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 1997) addressed 
creditors' rights to annuity proceeds that had been purchased with workers' 
compensation proceeds. The Soma and Berube courts did not address creditors' 
rights to the workers' compensation payments themselves. 
In summary, the circumstances of each of the foregoing decisions are 
different than the facts of this case. Consequently, these other decisions provide 
little guidance with respect to the unique circumstances of this case. The 
Commission believes that Mr. William's right to receive his disability 
compensation must be resolved according to the plain language of section 422. 
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POINT TWO: FLORIDA ASSET'S CLAIM AGAINST MR. 
WILLIAMS' DISABILITY BENEFITS IS CONTRARY TO 
PUBLIC POLICY AND LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE OF 
SECTION 422 IN PARTICULAR AND THE WORKERS5 
COMPENSATION ACT IN GENERAL. 
While the process of statutory interpretation must begin with the language 
of the statute itself, the Utah Supreme Court has also observed that: 
"(t)he primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect 
to the intent of the legislature in light of the purpose the state was 
meant to achieve. Although we generally rely on the plain language 
rule of statutory construction, we note that an equally important rule 
is that a statute should be construed as a whole, with all of its 
provisions construed to be harmonious with each other and with the 
overall legislative objective of the statute." 
Utah State Road Comm'n v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 831 (Utah 1984); (internal 
citations omitted.) See also Thomas v. Color Country Management, 84 P.3d at 
1205. It is therefore appropriate to consider the purpose and objective of 
Section422 within the larger context of the workers' compensation system. 
This Court's comments in Reteuna v. Industrial Commission, 185 P. at 
537, decided only two years after the Utah legislature created the state's workers' 
compensation system, bear repeating: 
The beneficent purposes of the (workers' compensation) act, and of 
similar acts, have been repeatedly stated by the courts of this and 
other states. It has not only for its object to secure compensation to 
an injured employee or to those dependent upon one killed by 
accident while so employed, but to relieve society of the care and 
support of the unfortunate victims of the industrial accident. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Thus, the workers' compensation system is intended to provide an injured 
worker with benefits that replace, to some extent, the wages that the worker would 
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have earned and used to support himself or herself, and any dependents. As 
explained in Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, Vol. 1, §1.03(5), p. 1-10: 
A compensation system, unlike a tort recovery, does not 
pretend to restore to the claimant what he or she has tost; it gives 
claimant a sum which, added to his or her remaining earning ability, 
if any, will presumably enable claimant to exist without being a 
burden to others. 
An award of workers' compensation disability benefits is "the signal for the 
setting in motion of a scheme of social protection which goes no further in nature, 
amount, or duration than the necessities of the protection require." Ibid. p. 1-12. 
Chief Justice Cardozo of the Newr York Court of Appeals eloquently expressed 
this objective of workers' compensation systems in Surace v. Danna, 161 N.E. 
315 (N.Y. 1923): 
. . . . The Workmen's Compensation Law was framed to 
supply an injured workman with a substitute for wages during the 
whole or at least a part of the term of disability. He was to be saved 
from becoming one of the derelicts of society, a fragment of human 
wreckage. (Citations omitted.) He was to have enough to sustain 
him in a fashion measurably consistent with his former habits of life 
during the trying day of readjustment. The cost of such support 
becomes a charge upon the industry without regard to fault. 
Rehabilitation of the man, not payment of his ancient debts, is the 
theme of the statute, and its animating motive. 
In more prosaic terms, it is fundamental to workers' compensation systems 
that injured workers have a continuing source of income to meet their basic needs 
and to prevent them from becoming a charge on society. This principle holds true 
in Utah, where protections for the injured worker's "stream of income" is woven 
throughout the Act, as follows: 
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Periodic payment of disability benefits. All disability compensation paid 
pursuant to the Act, whether for temporary disability under Section34A-2-410, 
permanent partial disability under Section34A-2-412, or permanent total disability 
under Section34A-2-413, is calculated on a weekly basis and paid in monthly 
installments over time. Thus, the method of computation and payment of benefits 
is intended to provide a continuing source of income to the injured worker. 
Requirement of Commission approval. Section 34A-2-421 of the Act 
specifically limits lump-sum payments of disability benefits to only those cases 
presenting special circumstances, and only with the approval of one of the 
Commission's Administrative Law Judges, as follows: 
An administrative law judge, under special circumstances and 
when the same is deemed advisable, may commute periodic benefits 
to one or more lump-sum payments. 
Thus, Section 34A-2-421 represents another manifestation of legislative 
purpose to maintain disability compensation as a continuing source of income for 
injured workers. 
Recent legislative action: Recent amendments to the Act reiterate 
legislative intent that any proposal to modify payment of benefits must be 
approved by the Commission. In 1995, the Utah Legislature amended what is now 
Section 34A-2-420 of the Act by adding subsection (4) (emphasis added): 
(4) . . . an administrative law judge shall review and may approve 
the agreement of the parties to enter into a full and final: 
(a) compromise settlement of disputed medical, disability, or 
death benefit entitlements under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act; or 
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(b) commutation and settlement of reasonable future medical, 
disability, or death benefit entitlements under this chapter or Chapter 
3 by means of a lump sum payment, structured settlement, or other 
appropriate payout. 
Once again, the legislature has protected the injured worker's ability to rely 
on a continuing source of income by requiring Commission approval of any 
"commutation," "settlement," "lump sum payment" or "structured settlement." 
The preceding paragraphs of this brief set forth the protections for periodic 
payment of benefits that are embedded in the Act. In Utah Copper Co. v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 193 P. 24, 27 (Utah 1920), the Utah Supreme 
Court discussed the necessity of such provisions: 
Society is interested in seeing that industries bear the expense 
of caring for those injured while working in such industries, as well 
as in seeing that the dependents of workmen losing their lives in 
such industries shall be protected and given at least some of the 
comforts of which they are deprived by the death of the provider. 
The Legislature wisely gave to the commission some discretion as to 
the time of payment and the application of the same to the support of 
the different dependents. It is a matter of common knowledge and 
human experience that in a great many cases it would be 
unreasonable waste to pay the entire amount of an award in a lump 
sum, and it would be criminal neglect to fail to see to it that the 
award, when paid, is used for the support of the minor children, left 
defenseless by the death of the father. The mother, often without 
business experience or any knowledge of financial affairs, would too 
frequently become the victim of unscrupulous, or, possibly, too 
optimistic promoters, and in a few short months the money awarded 
for the protection of the children of the deceased would, if released 
from the control of the commission, be invested in worthless 
securities. To defend against such losses the commission retains 
control of the award, and may direct its distribution among the 
dependents in such manner as it may deem just and equitable. 
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Although the Supreme Court's discussion in Utah Copper Co. is framed in 
terms of dependents' benefits, its underlying concerns and principles apply with 
equal force to benefits payable to injured workers. The Supreme Court's concerns 
certainly resonate with respect to the circumstances of Mr. Williams' case, now 
before this Court. 
POINT III: THE COMMISSION, AS ADMINISTRATOR OF 
UTAH'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION SYSTEM AND 
ALSO AS THE AGENCY WITH RESPONSIBILITY TO PAY 
MR. WILLIAMS' DISABILITY BENEFITS, IS AN 
INTERESTED PARTY IN THIS DISPUTE. 
In Point II of its brief, Florida Asset argues that "the Commission is not 
empowered to hear and determine private disputes" such as the proper payment of 
Mr. Williams' disability compensation. Florida Asset's argument misstates the 
role the Commission has actually taken in this dispute. 
For two separate reasons, the Commission does have a legitimate interest in 
assuring proper payment of Mr. Williams' disability compensation. First, Section 
34A-1-104(5) of the Utah Labor Commission Act authorizes the Commission to 
"administer and enforce all laws for the protection of the life, health and safety, of 
employees." Thus, the Commission has a general duty to see that the workers' 
compensation system is properly implemented. Second, the Commission, through 
the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, is actually liable to pay Mr. Williams' 
disability compensation. The Commission therefore has a specific duty to see that 
the disability compensation is properly paid. 
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While it is true, for the two reasons stated above, that the Commission is 
interested in this dispute, it is not true as suggested by Florida Asset that the 
Commission has attempted to "hear and determine" this dispute. To the contrary, 
the Commission has submitted to the jurisdiction of the district court and appellate 
courts for judicial determination of this matter. 
CONCLUSION 
The plain language of section 422 requires the Commission to pay Mr. 
Williams' workers9 compensation disability benefits to Mr. Williams, and no one 
else. The plain language of section 422 also exempts the disability benefits due 
Mr. Williams from all claims of creditors. 
Section 422, together with other provisions of the Act, implement a 
fundamental public policy of ensuring that injured workers have a source of 
income to obtain the necessities of life, without the need to turn to charity or 
welfare. 
The Court of Appeals' decision is consistent with the plain language of 
section 422 and the public policy embodied by the entire Workers' Compensation 
Act. The Commission respectfully asks this Court to affirm the Court of Appeals' 
decision. 
Submitted this 12th day of May, 2005. 
Alan Hennebold 
Utah Labor Commission and 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
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The Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants, Utah Labor Commission and the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund (collectively the "Commission"), and the Cross-Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment filed by Plaintiff, Florida Asset Financing Corporation ("FAFC"), came on for hearing 
before the Court on February 24, 2003, at 9:00 a.m. Mark R. Gaylord and Craig H. Howe 
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appeared on behalf of FAFC. Sandra L. Steinvoort appeared on behalf of the Commission. 
Based on the supporting and opposing memoranda, the arguments of counsel, and good cause 
appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The Commission's Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied; 
2. FAFC's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is hereby granted; 
3. FAFC is hereby entitled to enforce its interest in the Irrevocable Letter of 
Direction and in the Trust Agreement by directing the Commission to pay Robert Williams' 
disability benefits in accordance with the Irrevocable Letter of Direction; 
4. The Commission is hereby ordered to comply with the Irrevocable Letter of 
Direction by, among other things, paying Williams' benefits to him in accordance with the 
instructions set forth in the Irrevocable Letter of Direction, whereby Williams irrevocably 
directed that his "future payment(s)" be sent to him "in care of PHILIP NADEL, Trustee of the 
ROBERT W. WILLIAMS IRREVOCABLE TRUST, at 7777 Glades Road, Suite 110, Boca 
Raton, FL 33434 or to such other address as the Trustee may designate in writing"; 
5. The Commission is hereby barred and prohibited from interfering with FAFC's 
rights to enforce its interest in the Irrevocable Letter of Direction and in the Trust Agreement, 
including, but not limited to, a prohibition against paying Williams' benefits in any manner 
contrary to the terms of the Irrevocable Letter of Direction and/or contrary to this Order; 
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6. Judgment in favor of FAFC and against the Commission is hereby entered in the 
amount of $57,095.96, which shall be augmented by post-judgment interest at the highest legal 
rate. 
7. Pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court expressly 
determines that there is no just reason for delay in the entry of this Judgment on the claims raised 
in FAFC's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and expressly directs the entry of 
judgment on those claims. 
DATED this >/ day of fWJ^ 2003. 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
FLORIDA ASSET FINANCING CORPORATION, a Florida corporation, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION; Employers' Reinsurance Fund; and Robert W. Williams, an individual, Defendants 
and Appellants. 
No- 20030535-CA. 
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ckgroundz Secured creditor of workers' compensation claimant filed action 
nst Labor Commission, seeking to compel Commission to comply with 
vocable letter directing Commission to pay claimant's disability payments to 
t for his benefit. The Third District Court, Salt Lake Department, Stephen 
enriod, J., granted secured creditor's motion for partial summary judgment, 
ordered Commission to pay damages to secured creditor. Commission appealed. 
lding: The Court of Appeals, Pamela T. Greenwood, J., held, as a matter of 
t impression, that Commission had to comply with claimant's direction to 
his disability payments directly to him, even though claimant had 
iously sent Commission an "irrevocable letter" directing Commission to pay 
disability payments to a trust established for his benefit, and had assigned 
interest in trust to a creditor to secure debt. 
versed and remanded. 
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1631(D) Liabilities Enforceable Against Exempt Property 
163k62 Exceptions from Exemptions in General. 
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:ers' compensation benefits received; it precludes only attachment or 
:ution. U.C.A.1953, 34A-2-422. 
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[2] Workers' Compensation <£=:>1098 
413 
413XIII Assignment or Transfer of Rights 
413kl098 Assignment of Award or Judgment. 
An injured worker who has received workers' compensation may voluntarily 
issign those benefits to a creditor or other third party. U.C.A.1953, 34A-2-42 
3] Workers' Compensation <2^1098 
413 
413XIII Assignment or Transfer of Rights 
413kl098 Assignment of Award or Judgment. 
No assignment of funds is effective if it attempts to transfer workers' 
ompensation benefits prior to possession of the compensation by the recipient. 
.C.A.1953, 34A-2-422. 
4] Workers' Compensation <®^1003 
413 
413X Payment of Compensation and Compliance with Award 
413X(A) Mode of Payment or Compliance m General 
413kl003 In General. 
[See headnote text below] 
I] Workers' Compensation <@^1004 
413 
413X Payment of Compensation and Compliance with Award 
413X(A) Mode of Payment or Compliance in General 
413kl004 Payment to Representatives of Persons Entitled and Others. 
[See headnote text below] 
] Workers' Compensation ^S^lOgO 
413 
413X11 Administrative Officers and Boards 
413kl090 Powers and Duties m General. 
While the Labor Commission is obligated to pay workers' compensation benefits 
rectly to the injured worker or the worker's dependents, after payment of the 
mpensation, whether m a lump-sum or monthly installments, the direction and 
e of the funds is outside the control and mandate of the Commission. 
C.A.1953, 34A-2-422; U.A.C. R612-1-6, subd. A. 
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Workers' Compensation <®^ ::>1098 
413 
413XIII Assignment or Transfer of Rights 
413kl098 Assignment of Award or Judgment. 
Lie a workers' compensation recipient could technically assign the right to 
re compensation payments, in Utah, such an assignment is not enforceable 
ist the Labor Commission, and only against the recipient after payment is 
Lved. U.C.A.1953, 34A-2-422. 
Exemptions <®^3 7 
163 
1631 Nature and Extent 
1631(C) Property and Rights Exempt 
163k37 Specific Exemptions in General. 
ah's exemption statute, by protecting workers' compensation benefits from 
claims of creditors before payment to employees, requires that the worker is 
tied to actual receipt of the benefits. U.C.A.1953, 34A-2-422. 
Workers' Compensation <®^?1098 
413 
413XIII Assignment or Transfer of Rights 
413kl098 Assignment of Award or Judgment. 
.though a creditor is not expressly prohibited from obtaining an assignment 
/orkers' compensation benefits after receipt by the worker, it is clear that 
l an arrangement is a remedy or procedure for the recovery or collection of a 
:. U.C.A.1953, 34A-2-422. 
Workers' Compensation <@^1098 
413 
413XIII Assignment or Transfer of Rights 
413kl098 Assignment of Award or Judgment. 
abor Commission had to comply with workers' compensation claimant's direction 
send his disability payments directly to him, even though claimant had 
piously sent Commission an "irrevocable letter" directing Commission to pay 
disability payments to a trust established for his benefit, and had assigned 
interest in trust to a creditor to secure debt; otherwise, Commission would 
in untenable position of trying to determine the validity of assignment made 
claimant, and forced to discern the legitimacy of creditor's claim to the 
efits. U.C.A.1953, 34A-2-422. 
437 Alan Hennebold, Labor Commission, Salt Lake City, for Appellants. 
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Mark R. Gaylord, Craig H. Howe, and Matthew L. Moncur, Ballard Spahr Andrews 
Ingersoll, Salt Lake City, for Appellee. 
Before BILLINGS, P.J., and GREENWOOD and ORME, JJ. 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
il 1 The Utah Labor Commission (the Commission) appeals the trial court's gran 
)f *438 Florida Asset Financing Corporation's (Florida Asset) motion for 
>artial summary judgment, and the trial court's order that the Commission pay 
57,095.96 in damages to Florida Asset. Specifically, the Commission contends 
hat the trial court erred in interpreting Utah Code Annotated section 34A-2-42 
2 0 01). We reverse. 
BACKGROUND 
^ 2 In 1990, Robert Williams, a truck driver, was involved in a traffic 
incident while working. Williams suffered serious head, back, shoulder, and 
lee injuries in the accident. In November 1994, the Utah Industrial Commissioi 
7N1) awarded permanent total disability compensation to Williams. Under the 
Dmpensation order, Williams was awarded monthly disability benefits for the 
*mainder of his life or until further ordered by the Commission. 
1 3 In May 1995, Williams signed a security agreement and promissory note witl 
.orida Asset in exchange for a loan of $68,706.06. The note provided that 
ipayment of the loan would be via monthly payments from June 1995 to April 
>12. To secure the note, Williams established the "Robert W. Williams 
•revocable Trust" (Trust). The stated purpose of the Trust was the "management 
certain of [WilliamsJ's assets" and for the "maintenance, comfort, and 
pport of [Williams]." The security agreement and note signed by Williams 
signed and transferred all of his interest in the Trust to Florida Asset as 
curity for payment of the loan. Additionally, as provided for in the Trust 
cument, Williams sent the Commission an "Irrevocable Letter of Direction," 
ich informed the Commission of the Trust, and directed the Commission to pay 
lliams's disability payments to him in care of Philip Nadel, trustee of the 
ast. Finally, prior to any default, Williams stipulated to a consent decree 
Led in Alachua County, Florida Circuit Court. The circuit court entered an 
snded Consent Final Judgment (First Florida Judgment) on June 30, 1995, 
Dhibiting Williams from modifying the Irrevocable Letter of Direction. In May 
55, the Commission agreed in a letter to Williams to honor the terms of the 
revocable Letter of Direction. In a separate letter sent on the same day, the 
mission agreed to send the checks payable to Williams to Nadel as trustee of 
> Trust. 
f
 4 For several years, the Commission sent Williams's monthly disability 
.efits to the Trust. In 1997, Williams defaulted under the terms of the 
missory note and security agreement. (FN2) As a result, the Florida Circuit 
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3d 436, Florida Asset Financing Corp. v. Utah Labor Com'n, (Utah App. 2004) 
entered the Second Amended Final Judgment (Second Florida Judgment) 
ing Florida Asset a judgment against Williams, in the sum of $216,933.71 
nder the note and $110 0 in attorney fees. (FN3) In November 1999, 
ams instructed the Commission to send the compensation payments directly to 
ather than to the Trust. The Commission complied with Williams's updated 
-uctions. In June 2 000, Florida Asset attempted to enforce both Florida 
tents by filing them in the Fifth District Court, Washington County, Utah, 
ams failed to appear at a subsequent hearing, and in October 2000, the 
court ordered Williams to redirect his compensation benefits to the Trust, 
I on the two Florida orders and the Irrevocable Letter of Direction. After 
.ams refused to redirect the payments, the trial court issued a warrant and 
.ams was eventually arrested for contempt. At a followup hearing, by order 
le court, Williams signed a letter redirecting payments to the Trust. 
> In late March 2001, shortly after redirecting payments back to the Trust, 
.ams filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection. Due to the bankruptcy, the 
Lssion did *439 not implement Williams's court ordered instructions to 
:ect the payments to the Trust. In July 2001, the bankruptcy court granted 
Lda Asset relief from the automatic stay in order to pursue its claims under 
* law. After receiving a copy of the Order for Relief from the automatic 
, the Commission notified Florida Asset that it intended to honor the 
ructions Williams had signed redirecting payments back to the Trust, but 
ise of a six-month advance paid to Williams no "additional benefits [would] 
aid until December 2001." In November 2001, the Commission notified 
ida Asset that Williams had once again updated his instructions and 
rected payment of the benefits directly to him, and that the Commission 
nded to honor Williams's latest instruction. 
6 Florida Asset responded in July 2002, by filing a complaint in the Third 
rict Court against the Commission and Williams. The trial court entered a 
ult judgment against Williams after he failed to timely answer the 
laint. The Commission moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that no 
ractual relationship existed between Florida Asset and the Commission, 
ida Asset filed a motion for partial summary judgment on its secured 
saction claims. The trial court denied the Commission's motion to dismiss 
granted Florida Asset partial summary judgment. The trial court ordered the 
dssion to comply with the Irrevocable Letter of Direction and awarded 
•ida Asset judgment against the Commission in the amount of $57,095.96. The 
dssion appeals. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
7 The Commission argues that Utah Code Annotated section 34A-2-422 (2001) 
tires it to pay Williams's benefits to him directly, and precludes payment to 
"ida Asset through the Trust. " ' [M]atters of statutory construction are 
stions of law that are reviewed for correctness.' " Esguivel v. Labor 
n'n, 2000 UT 66,% 13, 7 P.3d 777 (quoting Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 
P.2d 658, 661 (Utah 1997)). "In addition, ' [w]here the issue is a question 
Law, ... appellate review gives no deference to the trial judge's or agency's 
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determination, because the appellate court has the power and duty to say what 
the law is and to ensure that it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction.' " I 
(quoting Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997) (alteration, 
in original) (other quotations and citation omitted)). 
ANALYSIS 
I. Utah Code Annotated Section 34A-2-422 
% 8 The Commission argues that by granting Florida Asset's motion for partial 
summary judgment, the trial court misinterpreted the plain language of Utah Coc 
Annotated section 34A-2-422 (2001), which states: "Compensation before payment 
shall be exempt from all claims of creditors, and from attachment or execution, 
md shall be paid only to employees or their dependents." Id. 
1 9 In this case, Florida Asset seeks to compel the Commission to ignore 
filliams's most recent direction and pay the benefits according to his previous 
lirection and the contract between Williams and Florida Asset. The 
nterpretation of section 34A-2-422 in this context presents an issue of first 
mpression in Utah. When interpreting the plain language of a statute, " ' [w]e 
ssume that each term in the statute was used advisedly; thus the statutory 
ords are read literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or 
noperable. ' " Gillman v. Sprint Communications Co., 2004 UT App 143,11 7, 91 
.3d 858 (quoting Carlie v. Morgan, 922 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1996)). 
f 10 Statutes similar to section 34A-2-422 exempting worker's compensation 
snefits from creditors' claims vary significantly from state to state, as do 
Durt interpretations of these laws. We therefore begin with a preliminary 
Lscussion of other states' exemption statutes and interpretations to assist in 
jtr analysis of Utah's statute. 
A. Assignment of Benefits 
il 11 First, unlike Utah's, most states' exemption statutes explicitly prohibit 
le assignment of benefits. See, e.g., Ariz.Rev.Stat. *440 § 23-1068 (2004) 
Compensation, whether determined or not, is not, prior to the delivery of the 
Lrrant therefor, assignable."); Cal. Labor Code § 4900 (2004) ("No claim for 
>mpensation, except as provided in Section 96, is assignable before payment, 
t this provision does not affect the survival thereof."); Fla. Stat. ch. 
0.22 (2004) ("No assignment, release, or commutation of compensation or 
nefits due or payable under this chapter ... shall be valid...."); 
.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 342.180 (2004) ("No claim for compensation under this 
apter shall be assignable.... All compensation and claims therefor, except 
ild support obligations, shall be exempt from all claims of creditors."); 
v.Rev.Stat. 616C.205 (2004) ("[C]ompensation payable or paid ..., whether 
termined or due, or not, is not, before the issuance and delivery of the 
eck, assignable, is exempt from attachment, garnishment and execution, and 
as not pass to any other person by operation of law."). 
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,3d 436, Florida Asset Financing Corp. v. Utah Labor Com'n, (Utah App. 2004) 
L2 Interpreting Florida's exemption statute specifically prohibiting 
jnments, a Florida Court of Appeals invalidated a financial arrangement 
Lar to the one in this case. In J.G. Wentworth, S.S.C. v. Safeco Life 
ranee Co., 755 So.2d 138 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1999), an injured employee 
jned the right to her future worker's compensation benefits in exchange for 
sh payment. See id. at 138. After directing the payments to be paid to 
estate, she signed a will transferring the estate's interest in the payments 
le plaintiff lender. See id. The court held that the entire arrangement, 
iding her change of beneficiary, was an invalid assignment. See id. at 
39. Thus, we note that the arrangement between Florida Asset and Williams 
3 be unenforceable under Florida law. Moreover, several court decisions 
noted that where assignment of benefits is specifically prohibited, that 
ibition extends to funds that are traceable or identifiable to compensation 
fits. See, e.g., In Re Delgado, 967 F.2d 1466, 1467 (10th Cir.1992); 
ard v. Jacksonville Med. Ctr., 690 So.2d 589, 592 (Fla.1997); Highland Park 
e Bank v. Salazar, 555 S.W.2d 484, 487 (Tex.App.1977). 
13 A few states, including Utah, do not expressly prohibit assignments in 
r exemption statutes. Utah's statute provides that compensation "shall be 
pt from all claims of creditors, and from attachment or execution." Utah 
Ann. § 34A-2-422 (2001). Ohio and New Mexico's exemption statutes are 
ly identical to Utah's. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 52-1-52 (2004) ( 
pensation benefits shall be exempt from claims of creditors and from any 
chment, garnishment or execution and shall be paid only to such worker or 
personal representative...."); Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 4123.67 (2004) ( 
ept as otherwise provided ..., compensation before payment shall be exempt 
all claims of creditors and from any attachment or execution, and shall be 
only to the employees or their dependents."); see also Tex. Lab.Code Ann. 
8.201 (2004) ("Benefits are exempt from: (1) garnishment; (2) attachment; 
judgment; and (4) other actions or claims."). Court decisions in these 
es have noted that in the absence of statutory language prohibiting 
gnments, an injured worker could assign his benefits. See Romero v. Earl, 
N.M. 789, 810 P.2d 808, 811 (1991); Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Antonelli, 29 
St.3d 9, 504 N.E.2d 717, 718 (1987); Highland Park State Bank, 555 S.W.2d 
88. 
] f 14 Comparing Utah's exemption statute to those of other states, it is 
r that section 34A-2-422 does not explicitly prohibit the assignment of 
fits received. Our statute precludes only attachment or execution. If the 
legislature wishes to prohibit injured workers from assigning compensation 
tents, we encourage it to change the language of section 34A-2-422 to make 
intention clear. That is a matter, however, for the legislature to 
ess. 
B. Payment of Benefits 
15 Another significant difference between Utah's and other states' exemption 
utes is that section 34A-2-422 limits the exemption's protection against 
Lchment or execution to "compensation before payment." Utah Code Ann. § 
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34A-2-422 (2001). Other exemption statutes use broader Language allowing for 
protection of benefits either before *441 and/or after they are received by 
:he worker. See, e.g., Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 23-1068 (2004) (referring to 
1[c]ompensation, whether determined or not"); Fla. Stat. ch. 440.22 (2004) 
[stating no assignment "due or payable"); Nev.Rev.Stat. 616C.205 (2004) 
[providing that "compensation payable or paid ..., whether determined or due, c 
lot."); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 52-1-52 (2004) (referring only to "[c]ompensation 
>enefits" being exempt); Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 408.201 (2004) (stating only tha 
[b]enefits" are exempt). Only Ohio's statute uses the same limiting language 
LS Utah, prohibiting attachment or execution of "[c]ompensation before payment. 
>hio Rev.Code Ann. § 4123.67 (2004). (FN4) 
K 16 In Parker v. Indus. Commission, 87 Utah 468, 50 P.2d 278 (1935), (FN5) 
he Utah Supreme Court examined the limits of Utah's exemption statute. The 
ourt noted that nothing in the statute prevented injured workers from using 
heir compensation to pay creditors, but stated that the purpose was to protect 
enefits from creditors "before the employee reduces it to his possession." Id 
t 278. Likewise, in Ohio Bell Telephone Co., the Ohio Supreme Court, 
nterpreting an exemption statute identical to Utah's, stated that Ohio's 
tatute "exempts workers' compensation benefits only fbe fore payment' is made t 
claimant. There is no exemption of benefits from attachment provided for 
nder either statute after the award has been paid to the claimant." 504 N.E.2« 
t 718. 
K 17 Finally, Utah's exemption statute differs from many other states' 
batutes because it explicitly provides that benefits "shall be paid only to 
nployees or their dependents." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-422 (2001). This 
•atutory provision is reflected in an administrative rule promulgated by the 
:ah Labor Commission that states: "Any entity issuing compensation checks or 
rafts must make those checks/drafts payable directly to the injured worker and 
ist mail them directly to the last known mailing address of the injured 
Drker." Utah Admin. Code R612-1-6(A) (2004) (emphasis added). 
[2][3][4][5] U 18 Given the plain language of section 34A-2-422, and the 
lpreme court's statements in Parker, an injured worker who has received 
>mpensation may voluntarily assign those benefits to a creditor or other third 
irty. However, it is equally clear that no assignment of funds is effective if 
- attempts to transfer benefits prior to possession of the compensation by the 
icipient. See Parker, 50 P.2d at 278; Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 504 N.E.2d at 718. 
ider section 34A-2-422, and rule 612-1-6(A), the Commission is obligated to pa> 
Le benefits directly to the injured worker or the worker's dependents. After 
/yment of the compensation, whether in a lump-sum or monthly installments, the 
rection and use of the funds is outside the control and mandate of the 
•mmission. (FN6) 
K 19 Furthermore, it is significant to highlight that in those cases from 
her states where a creditor was seeking to attach or garnish compensation 
yments pursuant to an assignment or other agreement, in no case was the payor 
ate agency ordered to make the payments directly to the creditor. See, e.g., 
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.3d 436, Florida Asset Financing Corp. v. Utah Labor Com'n, (Utah App. 2004) 
o v. Cinco Star, Inc., 755 So.2d 822, 823 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2000) (permitting 
holding petitioner's compensation proceeds to disburse proceeds to secured 
ltor first, then remainder to petitioner)/ Highland Park State Bank v. 
zar, 555 S.W.2d 484, *442 488 (Tex.App.1977) To view preceding link please 
k here (allowing bank to recover compensation proceeds held m a savings 
ant after appellee defaulted on bank loan with account pledged as security); 
Bell Tel. Co., 504 N.E.2d at 718 (holding that creditor telephone company 
d attach compensation proceeds held in bank account because payments had 
ady been paid to worker). 
II. Williams's Arrangement With Florida Asset 
20 In light of this background analysis of Utah's exemption statute, we turn 
he facts presented in this case. Shortly after receiving an award of 
ensation for his injuries, Williams pledged his future benefits worth 
,624.00 to Florida Asset as security for a loan of $68,706.06. As part of 
transaction, Williams established the Trust, and named a Florida resident, 
lp Nadel, as the trustee. While the Trust's stated purpose was to provide 
Williams's "maintenance, comfort and support," the Trust's only asset was 
benefits payments to be received from 1995 to 2012, the precise length of 
required to satisfy Williams's promissory note with Florida Asset, 
lly, Williams sent an Irrevocable Letter of Direction to the Commission 
esting that all compensation payments be made to him, in care of the Trust. 
21 Although the checks were sent by the Commission to Williams in care of 
Trust, in actuality, Williams never saw or received the payments. The 
ents each month were mailed directly from the Commission to the Trust. The 
ida Court of Appeals in J.G. Wentworth, S.S.C. v. Safeco Life Insurance Co., 
So.2d 138 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1999), found a similarly creative paperwork 
tegy to be an improper assignment, stating: "[T]he employee's agreement to 
ge the beneficiary was simply part of the entire assignment of benefits 
saction. Where documents are executed as part of the same transaction they 
Id be considered together in determining their meaning and effect." Id. at 
][7] f 22 We likewise view Williams's Irrevocable Letter of Direction to be 
of the entire transaction with Florida Asset. In essence, Florida Asset, 
h has a judgment against Williams, seeks to garnish Williams's disability 
ents. Williams has now rescinded his voluntary direction to the Commission 
ave his payments sent to the Trust. The Commission is required by statute 
administrative rule to send payments directly to the worker. Furthermore, 
's statute, by protecting benefits "from all claims of creditors" "before 
tent" to employees, requires that the worker is entitled to actual receipt of 
benefits. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-422 Only after such payment may a 
ltor enforce an assignment. Although in Utah, a creditor is not expressly 
lbited from obtaining an assignment of benefits after receipt by the worker, 
s clear that such an arrangement is a "remedy or procedure for the recovery 
ollection of a debt." In re Delgado, 967 F.2d 1466, 1468 (10th Cir.1992) 
>tations and citation omitted). In this case Florida Asset obviously knew 
@
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~he source of its collateral for Williams's debt. 
[8] f 23 The Commission must comply with Williams's directions about where tc 
send his disability payments. Any other result places the Commission in an 
mtenable position of trying to determine the validity of an assignment or 
agreement made by the worker, and forces the Commission to discern the 
.egitimacy of a third party's claim to the benefits. This is contrary to the 
)lain language of section 34A-2-422 and the public policy embodied therein. 
This interpretation accomplishes the legislative purpose of assuring that, at 
the time the employee receives the compensation, the money will be available, 
intact, to him for use for the purpose for which it is intended--the support 
of himself and his dependents during the period of his disability. He may, o 
course, use the money for whatever purpose he deems advisable, but he can be 
divested of his right to the money only as the result of his voluntary acts 
after he has received it. 
Highland Park State Bank v. Salazeir, 555 S.W.2d 484, 487-88 (Tex. App. 1977) 
emphasis added). 
*443, f 24 We note that Williams may benefit by collecting disability payment 
fter presumably having spent the loan proceeds he has failed to repay, 
lthough the proper remedy for Williams's breach of contract with Florida Asset 
s not to allow Florida Asset to force the Commission to bypass Williams and th< 
tatutory structure for payment of benefits, Florida Asset retains its remedy o 
^forcing its several judgments against Williams directly. 
% 25 Therefore, we reverse the trial court's order granting Florida Asset's 
Dtion for partial summary judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with 
lis opinion. 
% 2 6 WE CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS, Presiding Judge and GREGORY K. ORME, 
idge. 
IFNI.) In 1997, the Utah Industrial Commission was renamed the Utah Labor 
Commission. 
'FN2.) The nature of the breach is not specified in the parties' briefs. It is 
also unclear whether or to what extent Florida Asset received funds in the 
Trust. 
FN3.) The Second Florida Judgment is not included in the record on appeal but 
the parties do not dispute its content. Florida Asset describes the 
$216,933.71 as principal, but we assume it must represent the principal sum of 
$68,000 plus accrued interest and perhaps penalties and/or accelerated 
payments. A copy of the promissory note is also not included in the record on 
appeal. 
FN4.) For detailed analysis of statutes and case law on the question of 
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3d 436, Florida Asset Financing Corp. v. Utah Labor Com'n, (Utah App. 2004) 
ther received award proceeds are exempt, see Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, 
idity, Construction, and Effect of Statutory Exemptions of Proceeds of 
±ers' Compensation Awards, 48 A.L.R. 5th 473, § 18, 534-47 (1997). 
..) In Parker v. Industrial Commission, 87 Utah 468, 50 P.2d 278 (1935), the 
Lrt considered whether the widow of an injured worker was, on behalf of the 
ceased's estate, entitled to accrued compensation which was awarded but 
>aid by the Commission prior to the worker's death. Id. at 278. At the 
ie this case was decided, Utah's exemption statute was located in Utah Code 
lotated section 42-1-74 (1933), but the language was the same as that in 
ih Code Annotated section 34A-2-422 (2001) . 
5.) We also note, however, that while a recipient could technically assign 
3 right to future compensation payments, in Utah, such an assignment is not 
zorceable against the Commission, and only against the recipient after 
fment is received. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-422 (2001) ("Compensation 
:ore payment shall be exempt from all claims of creditors...."). 
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ROBERT B. HART #3806 
HART & ASSOCIATES 
349 South 200 East #110 
Salt Lake CityUT 84111 
Telephone: (801)534-1100 
Facsimile: (801)534-1559 
Attorney for Applicant 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT WILLIAMS, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
MIKE PEERY TRUCKING, | 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND | 
OF UTAH, and EMPLOYERS' 
REINSURANCE FUND, 
Defendants. 
STIPULATION AND ORDER FOR 
PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY 
WC Claim No. 90-43881 
STIPULATION FOR FINDING OF PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY 
The undersigned parties hereby agree and stipulate as follows: 
1. That the applicant, Robert Williams, was injured in a compensable industrial 
accident on the 18th day of December, 1990, while in the course and scope of his 
employment with Mike Peery Trucking. 
2. The applicant's industrial injury occurred while he was driving along State^ 
Road 80 in Summit County, Utah, and he was involved in an accident with several othc 
vehicles. He received serious injuries including closed head injuries including hearing loss,! 
and orthopedic injuries including back, shoulder, and knee injuries. He received multiple 
facial and nasal injuries and he was given an impairment rating of 29% whoie person by Th. 
Mark McGlothlin. The parties stipulate that there are pre-existing impairments in excess 
of 10% whole person. 
3* The applicant was born on January 26,1944 and is 50 years of age. 
4, The Social Security Administration found the applicant was disabled from and 
after December 18, 1990. He is currently receiving disability benefits from that agency. 
5« Shortly after the applicant's industrial accident of December 18, 1990, the 
applicant became temporarily, totally disabled and received compensation from the Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah in the amount of $56,418.88. In addition, he has received 
permanent partial and permanent total benefits in the amount of $21,986.64, for a total of 
$78,405.52 paid by the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah. 
6. The applicant has not worked continuously or meaningfully in any line of 
substantial, gainful employment since his accident It appears to the parties that the 
applicant is currently totally disabled and will in all likelihood not be able to return to work 
again. The parties have concluded that the applicant has not been and is not now a viable 
candidate for vocational rehabilitation because of his approaching advanced age and has no 
transferrable skills, that referral for vocational rehabilitation evaluation would be an exercise 
in futility; and, therefore, the parties respectfully request and stipulate to the waiver of 
referral to vocational rehabilitation. 
7. Pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-69, the Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah is liable for the initial three (3) years of permanent total 
disability and the first $20,000.00 of medical benefits. It is agreed that the compensation 
payable during the initial six years amounts to $96,408.00. Fifty percent (50%) of this 
amount equals $48,204.00, Because the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah has paid 
$78,405.52, it is entitled to a refund from the Employers Reinsurance Fund of $30,201.52 
leaving a balance owing by Employers Reinsurance Fund of $18,002.48. Medical expenses 
have been paid by Workers Compensation Fund of Utah in the amount of $85,829.74 and 
is entitled to reimbursement for fifty percent (50%) of all amounts from the Employers 
Reinsurance Fund of Utah paid in excess of $20,000.00 upon the filing of duly verified 
petition, certifying the amounts thus expended. 
8. The parties agree that applicant's attorney, Robert B, Hart, is entitled to a 
reasonable attorney's fee for services in this matter, and request approval of the fee in the 
sum of $7,500-00, less $3,362*82 paid to date. The Employers Reinsurance Fund shall pay 
2 
« • 
• • 
« • 
applicant's attorney, Robert B. Hart, the balance of the attorneys tees in the amount of 
$4=tSfrt2, said sum to be deducted from the portion of amounts due to'applk*n*. 
9. Beginning MuMgm f^ 1,1994, the Employers Reimuranc«^ndggrees to pay ^j^^t^l 
the applicant the sum of $£sra& per week, to and including December ^^w^Beginning 
December « j 199JR the Administrator of the Employers Reinsurance Fund shall place the 
applicant on the ERF permanent total disability payroll, effective December^, 199$ at the 
rate of $309.00 per week. The ERF shall pay the applicant PTD of $309.00 per week, less 
a fifty percent (50%) offset for any Social Security retirement benefits received by the 
applicant. These benefits shall continue for as long as the applicant shall live or until further 
order of the Commission, 
10* The employer, Mike Peery Trucking, through it's insurance carrier, The 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, will pay all medical expenses arising out of the 
industrial injury, 
DATED this / ° day of November, 1994. 
loben Williams 
Applicant 
Richard Sumsion, Esq. 
Attorney for Employer and Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah 
tobert B. Haft, Esq. 
Attorney for Applicant Attorney for Employers Reinsurance 
Fund 
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ORDER 
< t t 
The foregoing stipulation has been reviewed and is approved by the Industrial 
Commission of Utah. The provisions thereof are hereby incorporated into this Order as the 
Order of the Commission. The attorney's fees of $7,500.00 to applicant's attorney is 
specifically approved. 
DATED this / / day of November, 1994. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
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